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THE REHNQUIST COURT AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*
The Honorable Marie L. Garibaldi
On September 26, 1986, William Rehnquist was sworn in as Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court. At that time the renaissance in state constitutional
law was at its peak and the Supreme Court had decided Michigan v. Long.' My task
today is to discuss how the Rehnquist Court affected state constitutional law. As
background, I shall discuss some general principles concerning state constitutional
law prior to the Long decision. Then, I will examine the response of the Rehnquist
Court and state courts to the plain-statement requirement of Long,2 focusing
specifically on the vexing problem of how a state court determines that its
constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than are afforded under
similar or identical federal constitutional provisions. Finally, I hope to demonstrate
that the "criteria approach" used by the New Jersey Supreme Court best balances
the dual concerns of a state court, which are: (1) to prevent its state constitution from
becoming a mere shadow of the Federal Constitution, and (2) to ensure that its state
constitution does not unduly expand its citizens' rights so that they bear only a slight
resemblance to the protections found under parallel provisions in the Federal
Constitution.4
I. BACKGROUND OF MICHIGAN V. LONG
A. State Constitutional Law Prior to Michigan v. Long
The renaissance in state constitutional law, designated the "new judicial
federalism,"5 was first recognized in Justice Brennan's oft-quoted statement:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections
*. Copyright © THE REHNQUIST CouRT. FAREWELL TO THE OLD ORDER OF THE COURT? (Bernard Schwarz, ed.
Oxford University Press, 1999 forthcoming). This remark is a revised and expanded version of the presentation,
delivered at the Rehnquist Court Conference at the University of Tulsa College of Law on Sept. 17, 1998.
t. Associate Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey.
1. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
2. See id.at 1041.
3. See State v. Hunt (Merrel). 450 A.2d 952,965-67 (NJ. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) [hereinafter M.Hunt].
4. See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy
Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOiREDAMEL.REv. 1015, 1063-64(1997).
5. Id. at 1015.
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often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.6
Later, Justice Brennan wrote:
Our states are not mere provinces of an all powerful central government.
They are political units with hard-core constitutional status and with plenary
governmental responsibility for much that goes on within their borders ....
[T]he composite work of the courts of the fifty states probably has greater
significance in measuring how well America attains the ideal of equal justice
for all .... We should remind ourselves that it is these state court decisions
which finally determine the overwhelming aggregate of all legal controversies
in this nation.7
The emphasis on state constitutions is a return to the earliest days of our
country. Before the adoption of the Federal Constitution, citizens relied on their state
constitutions to protect their rights.8 Indeed, many state constitutions provided the
model for the Federal Bill of Rights.9 In the 1960's, under the Warren Court, the
pendulum swung in the other direction and the Federal Constitution replaced state
constitutions as the primary source of protection of individual rights.'0 At that time,
the Federal Constitution ascended to center stage and state constitutions faded into
the background. " During 1969 to 1986, the Burger Court, however, retreated from
some of the more liberal holdings of the Warren Court, and state courts began to turn
to their state constitutions as a means to provide their citizens with greater rights than
they were receiving under the Federal Constitution.'2
B. The Long Requirements
"[A]s a historical matter, state constitutions exist and function independently
of the federal Constitution."' 3 All states have their own constitutions. Many of those
constitutions are long, detailed documents containing a number of provisions that are
6. william J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections ofIndividualRights, 90 HAR .L.REv. 489,
491 (1977).
7. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Supreme CourtJudge Versus United States Supreme CourtJustice:A Change
in Function and Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 225, 227,236 (1966) (explaining different roles in constitutional
interpretative theory and practice).
8. See Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399,400-01
(1987).
9. See id. at 400.
10. See A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGiNO ISSUES IN ST. CONSI. L.
1,6 (1988).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 7.
13. Kaye, supra note 8, at 403.
[Vol. 34:67
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only applicable to that state and for which no similar or identical federal
constitutional provisions exist. 14 In interpreting those provisions, it is undisputed that
state law governs.' 5
Several provisions exist, however, in state constitutions that are comparable or
analogous to provisions contained in the Federal Constitution. 6 Traditionally, in
those cases, the Supreme Court has declined to review "judgments of state courts that
rest on adequate and independent state grounds."' 7 Yet, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that "cases in which the record is ambiguous but presents reasonable
grounds to believe that the judgment may rest on decision of a federal question,"
present vexing problems to the Court.' 8 Whether a state court decision plainly sets
forth an "adequate and independent" state ground has often been difficult to
determine.'9 That issue "typically arises where a state court opinion discusses both
state and federal constitutional grounds for a decision without making clear whether
the court meant to expand the state guarantee beyond what it believed to be the
federal standard. 20
Before Michigan v. Long,2 "it was safe to assume that any lack of clarity as
to the basis of a state court judgment would be resolved in favor of the state court as
the final arbiter, and against further review." '22 If the state court opinion cited both
grounds, the United States Supreme Court would apply one of the following three
approaches: (1) "if the ground of decision was at all unclear ... dismiss the case,"
(2) remand the case to the state court to "obtain clarification about the nature of a
state court decision," or (3) examine state law to determine whether the state court
had applied federal law "to guide its application of state law or to provide the actual
basis for [its] decision."'  Finding all of those approaches unsatisfactory, in 1983,
the Supreme Court in Long replaced those approaches with a presumption in favor
of Supreme Court review.24 That presumption arises where (1) "a state court
decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the
federal law," and (2) "the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion."5 In such cases, the Court will
assume "that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so."'26 However, the Long Court declared that if the state
court indicates "clearly and expressly" by "a plain statement in its judgment or
14. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353,355 (1984).
15. See id.
16. Compare N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7 with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (both dealing with unreasonable searches and
seizures).
17. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
18. Id. at 126.
19. Kaye, supra note 8, at 407.
20. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIIIONAL LAW § 3-24, at 164 (2d ed. 1988).
21. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
22. Kaye, supra note 8, at 407.
23. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-39.
24. See id. at 1040-41.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 1041.
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opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do
not themselves compel the result... reached," then federal review of the case is not
permitted.27 The Supreme Court believed that requiring state courts to make a plain
statement would "provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state
jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet [would] preserve the
integrity of federal law."2
Critics were divided on whether the Court in Long was attempting to prevent
state courts from exceeding federal courts in the protection of fundamental rights or
merely holding "state courts directly accountable for their decisions, thereby
preventing them from hiding beneath the robes of the Supreme Court."'29 Probably
the best summation of Michigan v. Long is Professor Tribe's statement that Long
"advances interests which lie at the root of our federal system" and "also protects the
autonomy of state law."'3 Regardless of the reasons for the Supreme Court's
decision in Long, Associate Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that it "created an opening for state courts to strengthen their position in the federalist
system."v3' Requiring state courts to set forth plainly the "adequate and independent"
state grounds that form the basis of their decisions forces those courts to look beyond
the federal law and rely on their own state jurisprudence.
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S ADHERENCE TO LONG
During the Rehnquist term, there have been numerous Supreme Court cases in
which the Supreme Court has affirmed its adherence to the Long doctrine.32 Some
of those cases simply relied on boilerplate paragraphs from Long. For example, in
Illinois v. Rodriguez,33 the Court stated:
When a state-court decision is clearly based on state law that is both adequate
and independent, we will not review the decision. Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). But when "a state court decision fairly appears to
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law," we
require that it contain a "'plain statement' that [it] rests upon adequate and
independent state grounds," id., at 1040, 1042; otherwise, "we will accept as
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Stewart G. Pollock, The Court and State ContstitutionalLawRemarks on the Burger Court at the University
ofTulsa (Oct. 3,1996), in THEBuRGER CoURT. CouNTERREVOLTnONORCONFIRMATON?,244,245 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1998). See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, I EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONSTm
L. 29, 37 (1988) (suggesting that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Long was an attempt to expand
Supreme Court review "over potentially unpalatable state constitutional decisions"); Michael Esler, State Supreme
Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 30 (1994).
30. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 165.
31. Pollock, supra note 29, at 245-46.
32. For a complete list of cases in which the Supreme Court has repeatedly followed Michigan v. Long, see Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,7-8 n.2 (1995); CHARLES A. WRIGHT ETAL, 16B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4032,
at 444 n.14 (2d ed. 1996).
33. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
[Vol. 34.67
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the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way
it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so." Id., at 1041.
Here, the Appellate Court's opinion contains no "plain statement" that its
decision rests on state law. The opinion does not rely on (or even mention)
any specific provision of the Illinois Constitution, nor even the Illinois
Constitution generally. Even the Illinois cases cited by the opinion rely upon
no constitutional provisions other than the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. We conclude that the
Appellate Court of Illinois rested its decision on federal law.'
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz,35 the Court held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision did not "rest on an independent and adequate state ground," because the state
court had interpreted the challenged Pennsylvania Constitution's provision as offering
a protection identical to that provided in the Federal Constitution.36 Similarly, in
Maryland v. Garrison,37 the Court held that, because Maryland's Court of Appeals
relied not only on Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, but also relied
on the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and federal cases, the Supreme
Court had jurisdiction."
In three recent cases, the Rehnquist Court again reaffirmed its adherence to the
Long doctrine.39  In Arizona v. Evans,' an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the police stopped the defendant for a traffic violation and a subsequent
check with the patrol car's computer revealed an outstanding arrest warrant.4 ' While
placing the defendant under arrest, the police officer noticed a marijuana cigarette in
respondent's hand and found a small bag of marijuana in the car.42 When the police
later discovered that the warrant for respondent's arrest had been quashed, respondent
moved to suppress the marijuana as the fruit of an unlawful arrest.4 3
In Evans, the Court found that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision to
suppress the evidence "was based squarely upon its interpretation of federal law. Nor
did it offer a plain statement that its references to federal law were 'being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and d[id] not themselves compel the result that [it]
reached."'" Therefore, applying federal constitutional law, the Supreme Court
determined that the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of evidence seized
during an unlawful arrest resulting from a clerical error of either a court employee or
a sheriff's office employee.45
34. Id. at 182.
35. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
36. See id. at 588 n.4 (1990).
37. 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
38. See id. at 83-84 (1987).
39. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).




44. Id. at 10 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1041) (citation omitted).
45. See id. at l6.
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In reaching its decision in Evans, the Supreme Court emphasized its
commitment to Long, stating that "[w]e believe that Michigan v. Long properly
serves its purpose and should not be disturbed. 46 Under that decision, the Court
noted, "state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to
accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United
States Constitution."'" The Rehnquist Court further reiterated its belief that the "the
plain statement" rule will ensure "that state courts will not be the final arbiters of
important issues under the federal constitution; and that [the United States Supreme
Court] will not encroach on the constitutional jurisdiction of the states. '
Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Labron,49 a 1996 case, the Court held that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion did not rest on an adequate and independent
state ground, but was "interwoven with the federal law."'5 The Supreme Court
reached that conclusion because in some of the Pennsylvania state court cases, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on an analysis of federal cases.5' In his dissent,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, however, Justice Stevens opined that the Court's decision
"not only extend[ed] Michigan v. Long beyond its original scope, but stands its
rationale on its head... [E]very indication is that the rule adopted [by Pennsylvania]
... rests primarily on state law. Nor are these holdings 'interwoven' with federal
law."52 Justice Stevens went onto explain that, "[b]ecause the state-law ground
supporting these judgments is so much clearer than has been true on most prior
occasions, these decisions exacerbate [the unfortunate] effects [of the Long decision]
to a nearly intolerable degree." '53
In another 1996 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, over the dissent of
Justice Stevens and the concurrence of Justice Ginsburg, the Court in Ohio v.
Robinette54 once more affirmed its commitment to Long.55 The Supreme Court
framed the issue in that case to be whether "[t]he Fourth Amendment... require[s]
that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is 'free to go' before his consent
to search will be recognized as voluntary." '56 The Court held that it did not.57
The Court in Robinette found that the state court's opinion "clearly relie[d] on
federal law ... Indeed, the only cases it discusses or even cites are federal cases,
except for one state case which itself applies the Federal Constitution." ' The Court
found that "when the [Ohio] syllabus, as here, speaks only in general terms of 'the
federal and Ohio Constitutions,' it is permissible for us to turn to the body of the
46. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 9 (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,557 (1940)).
49. 518 U.S. 938 (1996).
50. See id. at 941 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 950 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation ommitted).
54. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
55. See id. at 33.
56. Id. at 33-34.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 37.
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opinion to discern the grounds for decision." 9 The Court again refused to depart
from Michigan v. Long and reaffirmed the Long presumption. 0
The Court's finding that many cases, as evidenced by the above, were based
primarily on federal grounds seems to conflict with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
previous statement at his confirmation hearing that:
I do not think the [United States Supreme] Court is necessarily the final
arbiter of the law of the land. It is the final arbiter of the U.S. Constitution
and of the meaning of Federal statutes and treaties. But we still live in a
somewhat pluralistic society where the States' highest courts are the final
arbiters of the meaning of their State constitutions.6
The Court's application of Long, however, has led it to hold that a substantial
number of state cases do not support the conclusion that they were decided on
independent and adequate state grounds.62 Indeed, in the five years before Long, "the
Supreme Court reviewed 50% of the cases raising state grounds arguments."63 In the
five years after Long, "the Court reviewed 86.7% of the cases arguing independent
nonfederal grounds., 64 These percentages suggest that the "justifications offered by
the Court for preserving the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine,"
namely the "[r]eluctance to render advisory opinions and respect for state court
decisions.., are not being realized under the post-Long era. 65
111. RESPONSE OF COURTS TO THE LONG REQUIREMENTS
Nevertheless, because of the Long decision, state courts have had to determine
whether their state constitutions offer greater protection of individual rights than those
offered under similar or identical provisions of the Federal Constitution. One
commentator noted, "[i]n the past several decades, during which judicial federalism
came of age, state courts adopted a variety of methodologies in approaching litigants'
arguments that they should be accorded more rights under the state constitution than
were currently (or were likely to be) recognized under the Federal Constitution."66
Some state courts have followed well-established federal precedent when
interpreting a similar or identical state constitutional issue; indeed, some courts have
followed in "lockstep," with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal
59. Id.
60. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 33-35.
61. Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State Constitutions, 27 GoNZ. L. REv.
1, 2 (quoting Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1986)).
62. See WRIGHT, supra note 32, § 4032, at 444.
63. W.Craig Williams, ConstitutionalLaw: Premature FederalAdjudication Through the Plain StatementRule,
8 U. FLA. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 129, 138 n.64 (1996).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 135.
66. Williams, supra note 4, at 1018; see also James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. Rev. 223, 259 (1996).
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Constitution.67 Others have given federal constitutional law some deference, but have
used state constitutional law "as a supplementary or interstitial source of rights,"
justifying their departure from federal holdings. 68 Still others have adopted "the
primacy approach," in which courts conduct a completely independent analysis of
their state constitutions without giving United States Supreme Court decisions any
more weight than is given to other state court decisions.69 In light of these various
practices employed by the courts, "[s]cholars continue to catalog the different
sequential approaches to state and federal constitutional analysis .... .70
As Justice Souter observed while serving on the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, in the field of state constitutional law, state courts are often faced with
difficult choices.7 Justice Souter stated: "If we place too much reliance on federal
precedent we will render the State rules a mere row ofshadows; if we place too little,
we will render State practice incoherent."72
Although New Jersey, the home of Justice Brennan, has always been a strong
advocate of the new judicial federalism, the New Jersey Supreme Court has chosen
the "criteria" approach, under which we apply certain criteria to both the federal and
state constitutions to determine whether we will rely on federal constitutional law
rather than state constitutional law.73 There appears to be a growing trend among
state courts to adopt the "criteria approach."74
In State v. Hunt, Justice Handler, a member of my court, in a concurring
opinion, set forth the judicial principles that a New Jersey court should consider in
determining whether our state constitution affords its citizens greater protections than
found under parallel provisions in the Federal Constitution.75 In Hunt, Justice
Handler acknowledged that it is essential that a "considerable measure of cooperation
must exist in a truly effective federalist system. Both federal and state courts share
the goal of working for the good of the people to ensure order and freedom under
what is publicly perceived as a single system of law."76 Justice Handler recognized
the danger of erosion or dilution of constitutional doctrine if "state courts [turn]
uncritically to their state constitutions for convenient solutions to problems not
readily or obviously found elsewhere."'77
Justice Handler then identified seven standards or criteria that our state courts
should consider in determining whether to invoke the New Jersey Constitution.78
First, a state court must examine the textual language of the two constitutional
67. See Earl M. Maltz, The Po ticalDynamicof the "New JudicialFederalsm", 2 EMERGINGIsstUsINST.CONsT.
L. 233,233-34 (1989).
68. See Williams, supra note 4, at 1019.
69. See id.; see also Williams, supra note 14, at 366.
70. Williams, supra note 4, at 1018.
71. Seeid. at 1063.
72. Id. (quoting State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring specially)).
73. See id. at 1021-22; see also, M.Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (NJ. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
74. See Williams, supra note 4, at 1025.
75. See M.Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965-67.
76. Id. at 964.
77. Id. at 963,965-67.
78. Id. at 965-67.
[Vol. 34.67
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provisions.79 That examination is relevant foi two reasons: (1) distinctive provisions
of the state constitution may recognize rights not identified in the United States
Constitution, and (2) "the phrasing of a particular provision in our [constitution] may
be so significantly different from the language used" in the Federal Constitution as
to suggest an independent interpretation under the state constitution."0 Secondly, the
court should examine the legislative history of the state constitution to determine
whether its drafters had a different intention in formulating the state constitution than
the founding fathers had in drafting the Federal Constitution."'
Thirdly, the court should examine pre-existing state law, which may "suggest
distinctive state constitutional rights." 2 Under the fourth criteria, a court should
examine the structural differences between the federal and state constitutions to see
if they "also provide a basis for rejecting the constraints of federal doctrine at the
state level."8 3 For example, the Federal Constitution grants enumerated powers while
our state constitution "serves only to limit the sovereign power [that] inheres directly
[to] the people."8 4 Therefore, "the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in [the
New Jersey] Constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a
restriction upon them.",85 The fifth criteria requires the court to determine whether the
contested issue concerns a matter of particular state interest or local concern. 6
Closely aligned to the fifth criteria is the sixth: whether the "state's history and
traditions" call for an "independent application of [the state] constitution."8" Finally,
the court should examine the public attitude of the state's citizenry to ascertain if
general opinion may provide grounds to broaden state constitutional rights.88
The criteria are illustrative and not exhaustive; "[t]hey share a common thread
-that distinctive and identifiable attributes of a state government, its laws and its
people justify recourse to the state constitution as an independent source for
recognizing and protecting individual rights."8 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted the Hunt criteria in State v. Williams.' Although Hunt and Williams were
decided before Long, we continue to adhere to those principles.
Some commentators,9' and indeed, Justice Pashman, in a separate concurrence
in Hunt,92 believe that the "criteria approach" establishes a presumption in favor of
the Federal Constitution. By using that approach:
a state court is compelled to focus on the Supreme Court's decision, and to
79. See id. at 965.
80. Id.
81. See M.Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 965-66.
84. Id. at 966.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. M.Hunt, 450 A.2d at 966.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 967.
90. 459 A.2d 641,650 (NJ. 1983).
91. See Williams, supra note 14, at 386-89.
92. See M.Hunt, 450 A.2d at 960 & n.1 (Pashman, J., concurring).
9
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explain, in terms of the identified criteria, why it is not following the Supreme
Court precedent. It is a relational, or comparative approach, which analyzes
the relationship between, or comparison of, federal and state constitutional
law. The stated criteria form a checklist of hurdles or prerequisites for the
applicability of a state's highest law. A truly independent state constitutional
interpretation 'that will stand the test of detached criticism' is, under this
approach, not enough.93
Interestingly, Justice Handler, the author of the Hunt criteria, criticized the New
Jersey Supreme Court in a capital-murder case for attempting "to clone the federal
constitution to determine and define critical capital-murder issues and rights."94 He
asserted that "the random selection of constitutional protections, sometimes federal,
sometimes state," has resulted in inconsistent approaches in capital-murder cases. 95
Another member of my court, Justice Pollock, in State v. Lund,96 also chided the
court for relying solely on federal constitutional law and failing to address state
constitutional issues.97
As expected from such generalized criteria, even if my court agreed that the
criteria were to be considered, the New Jersey Supreme Court rarely has been
unanimous about whether such guidelines have established an adequate and
independent basis on which to ground a judgment. An examination of State v.
Hempele98 best illustrates the court's dilemma in determining whether the criteria
approach should be used, and if used, how it should be applied.
Despite the United States Supreme Court opinion in California v. Greenwood,99
in which the Court refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to curbside
garbage left out for collection, both New Jersey"tt and Washington State,"0' which
also favors the criteria approach, have provided constitutional protection to an
individual's garbage. In Hempele, a majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned that the United States Supreme Court may be reluctant to impose Fourth
Amendment protection that would bind every state.0 2 That consideration, combined
with New Jersey's efficient search warrant process, led the majority to extend state
constitutional protection to an individual's curbside garbage.0 3
The decision, however, was not unanimous. Justice O'Hern, in his dissenting
opinion, eloquently described his reluctance to interpret the provisions of the New
93. Williams, supra note 4, at 1023 (quoting A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the
Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873,934 (1976)).
94. State v. Hunt (James), 558 A.2d 1259, 1292 (NJ.) (Handler, J., dissenting), reconsideration denied by 564
A.2d 873 (NJ. 1989) [hereinafter J.Hunt].
95. Id.
96. 573 A.2d 1376 (NJ. 1990) (Pollock, J., concurring).
97. See generally Lund, 573 A.2d at 1385-87 (NJ. 1990) (Pollock, J., concurring).
98. 576 A.2d 793 (NJ. 1990).
99. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
100. See Hempele, 576 A.2d at 813.
101. See State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115-18 (Wash. 1990).
102. See Hempele, 576 A.2d at 800-01.
103. See id. at814.
[Vol. 34:67
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Jersey Constitution as more protective than identically-worded federal constitutional
provisions. He listed two reasons: (1) a deep respect for the Federal Constitution and
the Supreme Court of the United States, and (2) "a pragmatic concern that the
reservoirs of the [New Jersey Constitution] may be drained by over-consumption."'' °
Justice O'Hern wrote:
For me, it is not enough to say that because we disagree with a majority
opinion of the Supreme Court, we should invoke our State Constitution to
achieve a contrary result. It sounds plausible, but one of the unanticipated
consequences of that supposedly benign doctrine of state-constitutional rights
is an inevitable shadowing of the moral authority of the United States
Supreme Court. Throughout our history, we have maintained a resolute trust
in that Court as the guardian of our liberties. 5
Justice O'Hern believed that relying on state constitutional doctrine when an
issue touches on the national identity may undermine respect for the Supreme Court.
He observed that, with regard to garbage, a citizen in Trenton ought not to have
greater rights than a citizen across the Delaware River in Morrisville,
Pennsylvania. " At a more pragmatic level, Justice O'Hern also "expressed concern
about the expansion of rights based solely on state constitutional grounds because of
the ease with which state constitutions may be amended."' 0 7 Indeed, one of the major
differences between state constitutions and the Federal Constitution is the facility with
which state constitutions can be and are amended.'
I also dissented in Hempele.1°9 I disagreed with the majority's claim that,
because of certain factors unique to New Jersey, federal constitutional law should not
apply. Applying the Hunt criteria, I concluded that there were no independent state-
constitutional grounds to justify our divergence from federal law in this area. As I
explained:
The textual language, phrasing, and structures of the Fourth Amendment and
article I, paragraph 7 are virtually identical. There is no state statute on this
issue and hence no legislative history that would support interpreting the
provision independently of federal law .... Nor do I find that discarded
garbage is a matter of particular state interest that affords an appropriate
basis for resolving this issue on independent state grounds. New Jersey
garbage is not unique, nor is there any reason to suppose that New Jersey
citizens have a greater expectation of privacy in their trash than do citizens
104. Daniel J. O'Hern, Remarks at the Occasion of the Harvard Law School Conference on the Honorable William
J. Brennan, Jr., at 10 (Mar. 14, 1998).
105. Hempele, 576 A.2d at 815 (O'Hem, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. See id. at 816 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
925,950-51 (NJ. 1982) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (regarding public funding of abortions, citizen of New Jersey should
not enjoy greater equal protection rights than other citizens of this nation).
107. O'Hem, supra note 104, at 10.
108. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 8, at 408-09.
109. Hempele, 576 A.2d at 816 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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of most other states. 0
I found that no public policy justified such a departure from federal law, and I
believed that "federal law better comports with the reasonable expectation of privacy
that most New Jersey citizens have for their discarded garbage placed on the street
for collection."'' . I found it impossible to discern a unique New Jersey state attitude
about garbage.
In my dissent, I also expressed concern that the majority's opinion would
perplex the public. I observed that:
A citizen becomes confused when he or she finds that under virtually identical
constitutional provisions, it is permissible for a federal agent, but not a New
Jersey law-enforcement officer, to search his or her garbage. Such
distinctions between federal and state constitutions are difficult for a citizen
to fathom. In my view, garbage does not change its constitutional dimensions
based on who searches the garbage in a particular location. Different
treatment of such an ordinary commodity appears illogical to the public and
hence breeds a fundamental distrust of the legal system that develops such
distinctions." 2
I recognize that, in some areas, state traditions may sustain a broader
interpretative context. For example, the free-speech provisions of the New Jersey
Constitution have long been interpreted as having a more expansive sweep than the
comparable provisions of the United States Constitution.' ' We have also, in certain
instances, found that Article 1, paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution affords
greater protection against unreasonable seaches and seizures than does the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. For instance, we have held that a vehicular
search incident to an arrest for a traffic offense is unreasonable under the New Jersey
Constitution.' We have also refused to adopt the good-faith exception under our
state constitution.' ' We have held that the New Jersey Constitution protects privacy
interests in telephone toll billing records," 6 and that our state constitution has more
liberal criteria for standing to challenge the validity of a search than those under the
Federal Constitution. "' We have even imposed a heavier burden on the State in
showing the validity of a non-custodial consent to search under our state constitution
than that required under the Federal Constitution." 8
110. Id. at 817-18 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
11I. Id. at 816-17 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 817 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., NewJersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,770-
71 (NJ. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626-28 (NJ. 1980), appeal
dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
114. See State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947,960 (NJ. 1994).
115. See State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820,856-57 (NJ. 1987).
116. See State v. M.Hunt, 450 A.2d 952,956-57 (NJ. 1982).
117. See State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311, 1318-19 (NJ. 198 1).
118. See State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (NJ. 1975).
[Vol. 34:67
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Despite those rulings, however, we recently held that two warrantless,
suspicionless searches were lawful under both the federal and state constitutions." 9
In each case, we declined to fashion our own analytical state constitutional
framework, but instead relied on the Supreme Court's analysis for considering the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. In New Jersey Transit, we applied
the Fourth Amendment special-needs balancing test to determine the lawfulness of
suspicionless searches of public employees and held that random drug testing of
transit police officers was not unreasonable under the New Jersey Constitution. 2 In
Ex Rel J.G., we again relied on the special-needs analysis and held that the statutes
providing for the testing of charged or convicted sex offenders for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
did not violate the Fourth Amendment or our state constitution.' 2'
IV. NEW JERSEY'S NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Based on those recent decisions, some commentators have suggested that the
New Jersey Supreme Court's commitment to new judicial federalism is waning. 22
I do not think so.
Today, there is much disagreement among the experts about the status of state
constitutional law. Some have concluded that the new judicial federalism has failed
because of its lack of doctrinal consistency in state court opinions.'23 Another scholar
champions state constitutionalism as "a process of giving voice to the state court's
understanding of the values and principles of the national community."' 24 At least one
commentator argues that the new judicial federalism has led to a "tidal wave of state
court opinions that diverge from the standards established under the federal
Constitution."'" Nevertheless, he recognizes that thenew federalism is alive and well
and will continue.'26
For various reasons, the new judicial federalism still meets with resistance.'27
As observed by Justice Pollock, that conclusion is supported by the findings of
Professor Esler, who estimates that state supreme courts based their decisions
primarily on state grounds in only twenty-two percent (22%) of their cases.
28
119. See New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 701 A.2d 1243 (NJ. 1997) [hereinafter
New Jersey Transit]; New Jersey exr el J.G., 701 A.2d 1260 (NJ. 1997).
120. See New Jersey Transit, 701 A.2d at 1255-60.
121. See New Jersey ex relJ.G., 701 A.2d at 1266-75.
122. See, e.g., Anna Snider & Cheryl Winokur, In First Cases, Poritz Shows No Liberal Bent, NJ.LJ., Sept. 29,
1997, at 1.
123. See, e.g., Pollock, supra note 29, at 254; Diehm, supra note 66, at 238. See also, James A. Gardner, The
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MIcH L. REv. 761 (1992) (contending that state constitutional law
has failed to produce coherent body of law).
124. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (1993).
125. Diehm, supra note 66, at 238.
126. See id. at 260.
127. See Joseph R. Grodin, The New Judicial Federalism: A New Generation Symposium Issue, 30 VAL U.L.REV.
601,608 (1996); Diehm, supra note 66, at 260.
128. See Pollock, supra note 29, at 252 (citing Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78
JUDICATURE 25, 28-29 (1994)).
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Additionally, in ninety-eight percent (98%) of the decisions based on state law, the
state supreme courts deferred to precedents of the United States Supreme Court.'29
According to Professor Esler, only eight states consistently utilize state law, basing
at least half of their decisions on state law grounds: Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, New
Jersey, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas. 3 '
Several reasons have been cited to explain why interest in state constitutional
jurisprudence appears to have diminished. The Rehnquist Court's emphasis on
federalism has shifted the focus of legal scholars from the "new judicial federalism"
that started in the late 1970's and flourished in the 1980's to the traditional garden-
variety federalism. Moreover, many state judges and attorneys, trained primarily to
consider the Federal Constitution as the fundamental protector of individual rights,
are reluctant to rely on state constitutional law. Federal law and jurisprudence is
much more developed than state law. Indeed, many state constitutions do not have
much history, and records of the constitutional conventions may be difficult to find
or are non-existent.' 3' Senior Justice Ellen Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court
has suggested that the lack of history and state law jurisprudence also results from
the fact that, even though most legal business is done in state courts (approximately
95%), and state courts determine the totality of rights of most litigants, most law
reviews and law professors still discuss only federal law. 132
Furthermore, because it is perceived that the new judicial federalism arose
primarily from an attempt to give criminal defendants greater rights under state
constitutions than they were receiving under the Federal Constitution, a backlash
developed among the legislators and voters. That backlash, presented a practical
problem for some judges, particularly those who had to run for election or
retention. 133 To avoid negative repercussions, some state judges may have preferred
to place blame for an unpopular decision on the United States Supreme Court. For
instance, in 1982, the voters of both California and Florida amended their respective
state constitutions to assure that the state judiciaries did not exclude evidence that
was admissible under federal law.' 34 On June 8, 1982, the California electorate
adopted Proposition 8, which amended Article I, section 28(d) of the California
Constitution to read, "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding."' 135 In Florida, voters adopted a constitutional amendment requiring the
Florida courts to construe state law "in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the
129. See id.
130. See id. at n.95.
131. See id. at 253 (discussing Esler, supra note 128, at 28-31).
132. Honorable Ellen Peters, Senior Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Remarks at the Fourth New York
University Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice (Feb. 11, 1998).
133. See Pollock, supra note 29, at 252.
134. See CAL CONST. art. I, §28(d) (amended 1982); FLA. CONsT. art. I, §12 (amended 1982).
135. CAL CONST. art I, § 28(d) (amended 1982). For a review ofsome ofthe reasons the voters adopted Proposition
8 and for a review of the California courts' subsequent treatment of the amendment, see Grover C. Trask, II & Timothy




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol34/iss1/4
1998] THE REHNQUIST COURT AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."'36
In New Jersey, the Legislature and voters also have expressed their disapproval
of some of the state supreme court's decisions that expanded protection for criminal
defendants. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey
Constitution prohibited the imposition of a death sentence when a defendant had been
convicted of causing only serious bodily injury resulting in death, as opposed to
purposely or knowingly causing death.'3 7 Several years later, the voters approved a
constitutional amendment explicitly permitting imposition of the death penalty "on a
person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing death or purposely or knowingly
causing serious bodily injury resulting in death."'38 Similarly, the New Jersey
Legislature enacted a statute limiting the state supreme court's proportionality review
in death penalty cases "to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death
has been imposed" rather than to all cases in which the death penalty could have been
imposed. '9
As Justice Pollock, a member of our court, has written:
Even if the [Supreme Court] is perceived as infallible only because it is final,
the perception of infallibility, or something close to it, survives. As a
practical matter, a state court that reaches a decision on a state ground
contrary to a decision of the United States Supreme Court on a parallel
federal ground must justify its decision to the legal community and to the
public. In an era of constant public concern about crime, a state court's
justification for granting enhanced protection to the rights of criminal
defendants better be persuasive."
One of the strongest arguments against the new judicial federalism is that "[a]
national culture and a national media support a national political life. In all of these
ways-from defense to art-modernity works against federalism."'' As noted by
Paul Kahn:
Although some states may have been founded to secure a place for difference
from existing political communities, most states were founded not in order to
be different, but to realize for their own communities the ideals that are the
common heritage of the nation. Whatever the differences in historical origins,
those differences are less and less relevant to today's communities. 42
However, some commentators reason that, rather than fragmenting, "[t]his
136. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (amended 1982). For an excellent historical analysis of Florida constitutional law, see
David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill ofRights, 14 NOVA L.
REv. 693 (1990).
137. See State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792, 807 (NJ. 1988).
138. See NJ. CONST. art. I, J 12 (amended 1992).
139. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-3(e) (West Supp. 1998).
140. Pollock, supra note 29, at 251-52.
141. Kahn, supra note 124, at 1150.
142. Id. at 1166.
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[new] federalism can make of us a better national community.' 43 They believe that
by freeing "state courts to place themselves in the tradition of American
constitutionalism... then the meaning of American citizenship is enriched .... It
is especially enriched because fifty different courts will talk with each other, as well
as with the federal courts[.J"'44 Ultimately, how you view the new judicial federalism
will depend on your views of the "federalist system, the role of state courts in a
constitutional democracy, and the relative roles of law and order and fundamental
rights at the close of the twentieth century.' ' 45
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear today that the assertion that a state constitution provides greater
protection than the Federal Constitution is no longer novel. In my Court, when we
base our decision on the New Jersey Constitution, we state clearly the "adequate and
independent" state grounds that form the basis for that opinion. Nonetheless, there
will continue to be cases where state courts will be faced with having to determine
whether its constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than afforded
under the Federal Constitution. In making that determination, state courts will still
be presented with the vexing problem of how to prevent state constitutions from
becoming "a mere row of shadows" of the Federal Constitution and from gleaning
such little guidance from federal law as to make state law "incoherent."'
' 46
I believe that New Jersey's "criteria approach" best solves that problem. By
providing criteria that must be considered in every case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has furnished consistency, at least in method, if not in analysis. I am concerned
about the extent to which fifty independent state court systems can substitute for the
federal courts in the protection of fundamental rights'47 and for the "common ideal
of American constitutionalism."'48 I agree with Justice O'Hern that "[t]he great
moral disasters of the twentieth century... all occurred in societies in which there
was no genuine rule of law, no appeal of last resort, no guarantee of liberties."' 49 I
also agree that, "[blecause the United States Supreme Court enjoys a profound
residue of trust, it occupies the position of the final arbiter, the as yet unassailable
guardian of our rights and liberties."' 0
I recognize that "state constitutional law plays a vital role in the federalist
system."'' Nonetheless, to me, the New Jersey criteria approach, which gives slight
deference to the United States Constitution, best achieves the appropriate balance for
143. Id. at 1168.
144. Id.
145. Pollock, supra note 29, at 251.
146. Williams, supra note 4, at 1063.
147. See Diehm, supra note 66, at 244-45.
148. Kahn, supra note 124, at 1166.
149. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 815-16 (NJ. 1990) (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. O'Hem, supra note 104, at 8.
151. Pollock, supra note 29, at 255.
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determining whether a state constitution provides greater protection of individual
rights than a similar federal constitutional provision. Requiring a state court to
explain its departure from the interpretation of an identically worded federal
constitutional provision focuses the court's attention on reconciling seemingly
analogous provisions of state and federal constitutions. Unless the state court can
show from an examination of the textual language of the two constitutional
provisions, the legislative history of the state constitution, or the state's history and
tradition that the matter is of particular state interest or concern, it should not expand
federal constitutional rights under an identical state constitutional provision. Those
cases where there is a discernible reason to interpret identical federal and state
provisions differently will be limited.
Applying the criteria approach will not diminish the importance of state
constitutions or state courts. As observed by Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New
York Court of Appeals, "[o]verwhelmingly, our nation's legal disputes are centered
in the state courts, which handle more than ninety-seven percent of the litigation."' 2
Entire "categories of cases affecting the day-to-day circumstances, indeed survival,
of our citizens are largely[,] if not exclusively adjudicated in the state courts.' 153
State courts determine in large part "how well this nation attains its ideal of equal
justice."'5 4 In doing that work, the state courts will rely not only on their state
constitutions but on that "golden and sacred rule of reason," the common law.'55 "As
the courts both literally and figuratively closest to the people, it is beyond question
that state courts [will] continue to play a vital role in shaping the lives of our
citizenry ' and that state constitutional law will continue to play a vital role in the
federalist system.
152. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1995) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. (quoting CHARLF.MuaM., FUNDAMENTALLAWANDThEAMERICANREVOLunON, 1760-1776,46 (1966)).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
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